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Fading Cognitive Multiple-Access Channels With
Confidential Messages
Ruoheng Liu, Yingbin Liang and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract
The fading cognitive multiple-access channel with confidential messages (CMAC-CM) is investigated, in which
two users attempt to transmit common information to a destination and user 1 also has confidential information
intended for the destination. User 1 views user 2 as an eavesdropper and wishes to keep its confidential information as
secret as possible from user 2. The multiple-access channel (both the user-to-user channel and the user-to-destination
channel) is corrupted by multiplicative fading gain coefficients in addition to additive white Gaussian noise. The
channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be known at both the users and the destination. A parallel CMAC-CM
with independent subchannels is first studied. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel CMAC-CM is established,
which yields the secrecy capacity region of the parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subchannels. Next, the secrecy
capacity region is established for the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM, which is used to study the fading CMAC-CM.
When both users know the CSI, they can dynamically change their transmission powers with the channel realization
to achieve the optimal performance. The closed-form power allocation function that achieves every boundary point
of the secrecy capacity region is derived.
Index Terms
Secure communication, fading channel, multiple-access channel, equivocation, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless transmissions lack physical boundaries and so any adversary within range can receive them. Thus,
security is one of the most important issues in wireless communications. One approach to security involves applying
encryption algorithms to make messages unintelligible to adversaries. Unfortunately, these security methods are
often designed without consideration of the specific properties of wireless networks. More specifically, encryption
The work of R. Liu and H. V. Poor was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant CNS-09-05398, and by the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research under Grant FA9550-08-1-0480, and the work of Y. Liang was supported by a National Science Foundation
CAREER Award under Grant CCF-08-46028 and under Grant CCF-09-15772.
Ruoheng Liu and H. Vincent Poor are with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
(email: {rliu,poor}@princeton.edu).
Yingbin Liang is with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, USA
(email: yliang06@syr.edu).
2methods tend to be layer-specific and ignore the most fundamental communication layer, i.e., the physical-layer,
whereby devices communicate through the encoding and modulation of information into waveforms.
The first study of secure communication via physical layer approaches was captured by a basic wiretap channel
introduced by Wyner in [1]. In this model, a single source-destination communication link is eavesdropped upon by
an eavesdropper via a degraded channel. The source node wishes to send confidential information to the destination
node in a reliable manner as well as to keep the eavesdropper as ignorant of this information as possible. The
performance measure of interest is the secrecy capacity which characterizes the largest possible communication
rate from the source node to the destination node with the eavesdropper obtaining no source information. Wyner’s
formulation was generalized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner who determined the secrecy capacity region of a more general
model referred to as the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) [2].
More recently, multi-terminal communication with confidential messages has been studied intensively. (See [3]
for a recent survey of progress in this area.) Among these studies, a generalization of both the wiretap channel and
the classical multiple-access channel (MAC) was studied in [4], in which each user also receives channel outputs,
and hence may obtain the confidential information sent by the other user from the channel output it receives. In
this communication scenario, each user views the other user as an eavesdropper, and wishes to keep its confidential
information as secret as possible from the other user. The authors of [4] investigated the rate-equivocation region
and secrecy capacity region for this channel. Some other related studies on secure communication over multiple
access channels can be found in [5]–[7].
Fading has traditionally been considered to be an obstacle to providing reliable wireless communication. However,
over the past decade, it has been demonstrated that fading can help improve capacity, reliability, and confidentiality
of wireless networks. The impact of fading on secure communication was studied in, e.g., [8]–[10]. More specifically,
[8] studied the secrecy capacity of ergodic fading BCCs when the channel state information (CSI) is known at all
communicating nodes; [9] considered the ergodic scenario of fading wiretap channel in which the transmitter has no
CSI about the eavesdropper channel; and [10] studied the outage preference of secure communication over wireless
channels, in which the transmitter has no CSI about either the legitimate receiver’s channel or the eavesdropper’s
channel.
In this paper, we investigate the fading cognitive multiple-access channel with both common and confidential
messages, a problem which is inspired by the studies of secure communication over MACs in [4]. In our communi-
cation scenario, we assume that two users (users 1 and 2) have common information, while user 1 has confidential
information intended for a destination and treats user 2 as an eavesdropper. Hence, user 1 wishes to keep its
confidential messages as secret as possible from user 2. We refer to this model as the cognitive MAC with one
confidential message (CMAC-CM); (see Fig. 1.(a)), because this channel also models cognitive communication
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Fig. 1. Cognitive multiple-access channel with confidential messages.
in which the secondary user (user 1) helps the primary user (user 2) to send a common message W0, and also
has a confidential message W1 intended for the destination, which needs to be kept secret from the primary
user. Furthermore, we consider the situation in which both the user-to-user and the user-to-destination channels
are corrupted by multiplicative fading gain coefficients in addition to additive white Gaussian noise. The fading
CMAC-CM model captures the basic time-varying and superposition properties of wireless channels, and thus,
understanding this channel plays an important role in solving security issue in wireless application. For the fading
CMAC-CM, we assume that the fading gain coefficients are stationary and ergodic over time and that the CSI
is known at both users and the destination. Note that knowledge of the user-to-destination CSI is necessary in
order to cooperatively transmit the common message, and thus should be provided through state feedback from
the destination terminal to the user terminals. Knowledge of CSI between the user terminals can be obtained via
the reciprocity property of those channels. Users are motivated to do so in order to enable better cooperation for
sending the common message.
To solve the fading CMAC-CM problem, we first consider a general information-theoretic model, i.e., the parallel
MAC with L independent subchannels. As shown in Fig. 1.(b), the two users communicate with the destination over
L parallel links and each of the L links is eavesdropped upon by user 2. We establish the secrecy capacity region for
the parallel CMAC-CM. In particular, we provide a converse proof to show that having independent inputs for each
subchannel is optimal to achieve the secrecy capacity region. The secrecy capacity region of the parallel CMAC-CM
further gives the secrecy capacity region of the parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subchannels. Next, we consider
the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM, which is an example parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subchannels. Based on
the maximum-entropy theorem [11] and the extremal inequality [12], we show that the secrecy capacity region of
the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM is achievable by using jointly Gaussian inputs and optimizing power allocations
at two users among the parallel subchannels. We then apply this result to investigate the fading CMAC-CM. We
study the ergodic performance, where no delay constraint on message transmission is assumed and the secrecy
4capacity region is averaged over all channel states. In fact, the fading CMAC-CM can be viewed as the parallel
Gaussian CMAC-CM with each fading state corresponding to one subchannel. Hence, the secrecy capacity region
of the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM applies to the fading CMAC-CM. Since both users know the CSI, users can
dynamically change their transmission powers with the channel realization to achieve the optimal performance. The
optimal power allocation that achieves every boundary point of the secrecy capacity region can be characterized as
a solution to a non-convex problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (as necessary conditions) greatly
facilitate exploitation of the specific structure of the problem, and enable us to obtain a closed-form solution for
the optimal power allocation strategy for the two users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first study the parallel CMAC-CM with independent
subchannels and its special case of the parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subschannels in Section II. Next,
we investigate the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM in Section III and the ergodic
performance of the fading CMAC-CM in Section IV. We then provide some numerical examples in Section V.
Finally, we summarize our results in Section VI.
II. PARALLEL CMAC-CM
A. Channel Model
We consider the discrete memoryless parallel CMAC-CM with L independent subchannels (see Fig. 1.(b)).
Each subchannel is assumed to connect users 1 and 2 to the destination, and user 2 can also receive the channel
output from each subchannel, and hence may obtain information sent by user 1. The channel transition probability
distribution is given by
p(y[1,L], y2,[1,L]|x1,[1,L], x2,[1,L]) =
L∏
j=1
p(yj, y2,j |x1,j, x2,j), (1)
where y[1,L] := (y1, ..., yL).
In this model, a common message W0 is known to both the primary user (user 2) and the secondary user (user 1),
and hence both users cooperate to transmit W0 to the destination. Moreover, the secondary user (user 1) also has
confidential message W1 intended for the destination. User 1 views user 2 as an eavesdropper and wishes to keep
its confidential information as secret as possible from user 2. In this paper, we focus on the case in which perfect
secrecy is achieved, i.e., user 2 should not obtain any information about the message W1. More formally, this
condition is characterized by (e.g., see [1], [2], [4]):
1
n
I(W1;Y
n
2 ,X
n
2 ,W0)→ 0 (2)
where Xn2 := (X2,1, . . . ,X2,n) and Y n2 := (Y2,1, . . . , Y2,n) are the input and output sequences of user 2, respectively,
5and the limit is taken as the block length n →∞. The goal is to characterize the secrecy capacity region Cs that
contains rate pairs achievable by some coding scheme (more detailed definitions for the rates of the messages and
encoding and decoding schemes can be found in [4]).
B. Secrecy Capacity Region of the Parallel CMAC-CM
For the parallel CMAC-CM, we obtain the following secrecy capacity region.
Theorem 1: For the parallel CMAC-CM, the secrecy capacity region is given by
C[P]s =
⋃
Q
j
p(qj ,x2,j)p(uj |qj)p(x1,j |uj)
p(yj ,y2,j |x1,j ,x2,j)


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0;
R1 ≤
∑L
j=1[I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)]
R0 ≤
∑L
j=1 I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj)


(3)
where Qj and Uj’s are auxiliary random variables, and Qj can be chosen to be a deterministic function of Uj for
j = 1, . . . , L.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 implies that having independent inputs for each subchannel is optimal. This fact does not follow
directly from the single-letter result on the secrecy capacity region of the CMAC-CM given in [4]. Hence, a
converse proof is needed, which is provided in Appendix A.
C. Parallel CMAC-CM with Degraded Subchannels
We consider the parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subchannels, in which each subchannel is either degraded
such that given the input of user 2, the output at user 2 is a conditionally degraded version of the output at the
destination, or reversely degraded such that given the input of user 2, the output at the destination is a conditionally
degraded version of the output at user 2.
Following [4], we define the conditionally degraded subchannels as follows. Let A denote the index set that
includes all indices of subchannels such that given x2,j , the output at user 2 is a conditionally degraded version of
the output at the destination, i.e., for j ∈ A,
p(yj , y2,j|x1,j , x2,j) = p(yj|x1,j , x2,j)p(y2,j |yj, x2,j). (4)
We further define A¯ to be the complement of the set A, and A¯ includes all indices of subchannels such that given
x2,j , the output at the destination is a conditionally degraded version of the output at user 2, i.e., for j ∈ A¯,
p(yj, y2,j|x1,j , x2,j) = p(y2,j|x1,j , x2,j)p(yj|y2,j , x2,j). (5)
6Hence, the channel transition probability distribution is given by
p(y[1,L], y2,[1,L]|x1,[1,L], x2,[1,L])
=
∏
j∈A
p(yj|x1,j , x2,j)p(y2,j|yj, x2,j)
∏
j∈A¯
p(y2,j|x1,j, x2,j)p(yj |y2,j, x2,j). (6)
For the parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subchannels, we apply Theorem 1 and obtain the following secrecy
capacity region.
Theorem 2: For the parallel CMAC-CM with degraded subchannels, the secrecy capacity region is given by
C[D]s =
⋃
Q
j
p(qj ,x2,j)p(x1,j |qj)
p(yj ,y2,j|x1,j ,x2,j)


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0;
R1 ≤
∑
j∈A[I(X1,j ;Yj|X2,j , Qj)− I(X1,j ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)]
R0 ≤
∑
j∈A I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) +
∑
j∈A¯ I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Yj)


(7)
where Qj , for j = 1, . . . , L, are auxiliary random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationship
Qj → (X1,j ,X2,j)→ (Yj , Y2,j). (8)
Proof: See Appendix B.
It can be seen that the common message W0 is sent over all subchannels, and the confidential message W1 of
user 1 is sent only over the subchannels for which the output at user 2 is a conditionally degraded version of the
output at the destination. Furthermore, user 1 sends the common message W0 and the confidential message W1 by
using superposition encoding.
III. PARALLEL GAUSSIAN CMAC-CM
A. Channel Model
In this section, we consider the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM in which the channel outputs at the destination
and user 2 are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise terms. The channel input-output relationship is given by
Yj,i = X1,j,i +X2,j,i + Zj,i
and Y2,j,i = X1,j,i +X2,j,i + Z2,j,i (9)
where i is the time index, and for j = 1, . . . , L, the noise processes {Zj,i} and {Z2,j,i} are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) with the components being zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances νj
and µj , respectively. We assume νj < µj for j ∈ A and νj ≥ µj for j ∈ A¯. The channel input sequences Xn1,[1,L]
7and Xn2,[1,L] are subject to average power constraints P1 and P2, respectively, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
E[X21,j,i] ≤ P1
and 1
n
n∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
E[X22,j,i] ≤ P2. (10)
B. Secrecy Capacity Region
We now apply Theorem 2 to obtain the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian MAC. It can be seen
from (9) that the subchannels of the parallel Gaussian MAC are not physically degraded. We consider the following
subchannels, for j ∈ A:
Yj,i = X1,j,i +X2,j,i + Zj,i, Y2,j,i = Yj,i + Z
′
2,j,i; (11)
and, for j ∈ A¯:
Yj,i = Y2,j,i + Z
′
j,i, Y2,j,i = X1,j,i +X2,j,i + Z2,j,i (12)
where {Z ′j,i} and {Z ′2,j,i} are i.i.d. random processes with components being zero-mean Gaussian random variables
with variances νj −µj for j ∈ A¯ and µj − νj for j ∈ A, respectively. Moreover, {Z ′j,i} is independent of {Z2,j,i},
and {Z ′2,j,i} is independent of {Zj,i}. We notice that the channel defined in (11)-(12) is a parallel Gaussian MAC
with physically degraded subchannels. Since the channel (11)-(12) has the same marginal distributions p(y|x1, x2)
and p(y2|x1, x2) as the parallel Gaussian MAC defined in (9), these two channels have the same secrecy capacity
region.1
For the channel defined in (11)-(12), we can apply Theorem 2 to obtain he following secrecy capacity region.
In particular, the degradedness of the subchannels allows the use of the entropy power inequality in the proof of
the converse. We can thus obtain the secrecy capacity region for the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM.
Theorem 3: For the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM, the secrecy capacity region is given by
C[G]s =
⋃
p∈P


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0;
R1 ≤
∑
j∈A
[
1
2 log
(
1 + bj
νj
)
− 12 log
(
1 + bj
µj
)]
R0 ≤
∑
j∈A
1
2 log
(
1 +
aj+p2,j+2
√
ajp2,j
bj+νj
)
+
∑
j∈A¯
1
2 log
(
1 +
aj+p2,j+2
√
ajp2,j
νj
)


(13)
1This argument is in fact identical to the so-called degraded, same-marginals technique; e.g., see [4] for further details.
8where p is the power allocation vector, which consists of (aj , bj , p2,j) for j ∈ A and (aj , 0, p2,j) for j ∈ A¯ as
components, and the set P includes all power allocation vectors p that satisfy the power constraint
P :=

p :
L∑
j=1
(aj + bj) ≤ P1 and
L∑
j=1
p2,j ≤ P2

 . (14)
Proof: See Appendix C.
We notice that p denotes the power allocation among all subchannels. In particular, for j ∈ A, since user 1 needs
to transmit both common and confidential information, the pair (aj , bj) controls the power allocation between the
common message W0 and the confidential message W1. For j ∈ A¯, user 1 transmits only the common information,
and bj = 0 indicates that the power is allocated to transmit the common message W0 only.
C. Optimal Power Allocation
To characterize the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM given in (13), we need to
characterize every boundary point and the power allocation vector that achieve each boundary point. Since the
secrecy capacity region C[G]s is convex, for every boundary point (R⋆0, R⋆1), there exists γ1 ≥ 0 such that (R⋆0, R⋆1)
is the solution to the optimization problem
max
(R0,R1)∈C[G]s
[R0 + γ1R1] . (15)
Note that the optimization problem (15) serves as a complete characterization of the corresponding boundary of
the secrecy capacity region, and the solution to (15) provides the power allocations that achieve the boundary of
the secrecy capacity region. Let (x)+ = max(0, x). We obtain the optimal power allocation p that solves (15).
Theorem 4: Let p⋆ be an optimal solution to the optimization problem of (15) that achieves the boundary of the
secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM. Then, p⋆ can be written as follows.
For j ∈ A, if
2λ21 ln 2
λ1 + λ2
<
γ1(µj − νj)− µj
µjνj
, (16)
then
a⋆j =
λ22
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j − φj)+ ,
b⋆j = (min [s2,j, φj])
+
and p⋆2,j =
λ21
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j − φj)+ ; (17)
9alternatively, if
2λ21 ln 2
λ1 + λ2
≥ γ1(µj − νj)− µj
µjνj
, (18)
then
a⋆j =
λ22
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j)
+ ,
b⋆j = 0
and p⋆2,j =
λ21
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j)
+ ; (19)
for j ∈ A¯,
a⋆j =
λ22
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j)
+ and p⋆2,j =
λ21
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j)
+ ; (20)
where γ1 ≥ 0,
s1,j =
λ1 + λ2
2λ1λ2 ln 2
− νj,
s2,j =
1
2
[√
(µj − νj)
(
µj − νj + 2γ1
λ1 ln 2
)
− (µj + νj)
]
,
φj = −1
2
(
µj + νj +
1
ω
)
+
1
2
√(
µj + νj +
1
ω
)2
− 4
[
µjνj − γ1(µj − νj)− µj
ω
]
,
ω = (2 ln 2)
λ21
λ1 + λ2
(21)
and the pair (λ1, λ2) is chosen to satisfy the power constraint
L∑
j=1
(aj + bj) ≤ P1 and
L∑
j=1
p2,j ≤ P2. (22)
Proof: The optimization problem is non-convex. Our proof technique involves applying KKT conditions (as
necessary conditions), which help express the Lagrangian in the form of an integral. This specific structure of the
problem is then exploited to obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal power allocation strategy. The details
can be found in Appendix D.
IV. FADING CMAC-CM
In this section, we study the fading CMAC-CM, where both the user-to-destination and the user-to-user channels
are corrupted by multiplicative fading gain processes in addition to additive white Gaussian processes. The channel
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input-output relationship is given by
Yi = h1,iX1,i + h2,iX2,i + Zi
and Y2,i = g1,iX1,i + g2,iX2,i + Z2,i (23)
where i is the time index, X1,i and X2,i are channel inputs at the time instant i from user 1 and user 2, respectively,
Yi and Y2,i are channel outputs at the time instant i at the destination and the receiver of user 2, respectively;
hi := (h1,i, h2,i) and gi := (g1,i, g2,i) are proper complex random channel attenuation pairs imposed on the
destination and the receiver of user 2; and the noise processes {Zi} and {Z2,i} are i.i.d. with the components being
zero-mean proper complex Gaussian random variables with variances ν and µ, respectively. The input sequences
{X1,i} and {X2,i} are subject to the average power constraint P1 and P2, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X21,i] ≤ P1 and
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X22,i] ≤ P2. (24)
We assume that the CSI (i.e., the realization of (h, g)) is known at both the transmitters and the receivers
instantaneously. Depending on the CSI, each user can dynamically change its transmission power and rate to achieve
better performance. In this section, we assume that there is no delay constraint on the transmitted messages, and
that the secrecy capacity region is an average over all channel states, which is referred to as the ergodic secrecy
capacity region.
We notice that for a given fading state, i.e., a realization of (h, g), the fading CMAC-CM is a Gaussian CMAC-
CM. Hence, the fading CMAC-CM can be viewed as a parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM with each fading state
corresponding to one subchannel. Thus, the following secrecy capacity region of the fading CMAC-CM follows
from Theorem 3.
In the following, for each channel state (h, g), we use p1(h, g) and p2(h, g) to denote the powers allocated at
11
users 1 and 2, respectively. We further define
p(h, g) :=
(
a(h, g), b(h, g), p2(h, g)
)
. (25)
Let P denote the set that includes all power allocations that satisfy the power constraint
P := {p(h, g) : E[a(h, g) + b(h, g)] ≤ P1 and E[p2(h, g)] ≤ P2}, (26)
and A denote the set of channel states as follows:
A :=
{
(h, g) :
|h1|2
ν
>
|g1|2
µ
}
. (27)
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity region of the fading CMAC-CM is given by (28)
C[F]s =
⋃
p(h,g)∈P


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0;
R1 ≤ E(h,g)∈A
[
log
(
1 +
b(h,g)|h1|2
ν
)
− log
(
1 +
b(h,g)|g1|2
µ
)]
R0 ≤ E(h,g)∈A log
(
1 +
χ(h,g)
b(h,g)|h1|2+ν
)
+ E(h,g)∈A¯ log
(
1 +
χ(h,g)
ν
)


(28)
where
χ(h, g) =
[√
a(h, g)|h1|+
√
p2(h, g)|h2|
]2
(29)
and the random vector pair (h, g) has the same distribution as the marginal distribution of the process {(hi, gi)} at
a single time instant.
The secrecy capacity region given in Corollary 1 is established for fading processes (h, g) where only ergodic and
stationary conditions are assumed. The fading process (h, g) can be correlated across time, and is not necessarily
Gaussian.
Since users are assumed to know the CSI, they can allocate their powers according to the instantaneous channel
realization to achieve the optimal performance, i.e., the boundary of the secrecy capacity region. The optimal power
allocation that achieves the boundary of the secrecy capacity region for the fading CMAC-CM can be derived from
Theorem 4 and is given in the following.
Corollary 2: Let p(h, g)⋆ be an optimal power allocation that achieves the boundary of the secrecy capacity
region of the fading CMAC-CM. Then, p(h, g)⋆ is given as follows:
• for (h, g) ∈ A, if
λ21|h2|2 ln 2
λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2 <
γ1
(
µ|h1|2 − ν|g1|2
)− µ|h1|2
µν
, (30)
12
then
a⋆(h, g) =
λ22|h1|2
(λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2)2
[
s1(h, g)− φ(h, g)
]+
,
b⋆(h, g) =
(
min
[
s2(h, g), φ(h, g)
])+
and p⋆2(h, g) =
λ21|h2|2
(λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2)2
[
s1(h, g)− φ(h, g)
]+
; (31)
alternatively, if
λ21|h2|2 ln 2
λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2 ≥
γ1
(
µ|h1|2 − ν|g1|2
)− µ|h1|2
µν
, (32)
then
a⋆(h, g) =
λ22|h1|2
(λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2)2
[
s1(h, g)
]+
,
b⋆(h, g) = 0
and p⋆2(h, g) =
λ21|h2|2
(λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2)2
[
s1(h, g)
]+
; (33)
• for (h, g) ∈ A¯,
a⋆(h, g) =
λ22|h1|2
(λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2)2
[
s1(h, g)
]+
and p⋆2(h, g) =
λ21|h2|2
(λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2)2
[
s1(h, g)
]+
; (34)
where γ1 ≥ 0,
s1(h, g) =
λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2
λ1λ2 ln 2
− ν,
s2(h, g) =
1
2
[√(
µ
|g1|2 −
ν
|h1|2
)(
µ
|g1|2 −
ν
|h1|2 +
2γ1
λ1 ln 2
)
−
(
µ
|g1|2 +
ν
|h1|2
)]
,
φ(h, g) = −1
2
(
µ
|g1|2 +
ν
|h1|2 +
1
ω(h, g)
)
+
1
2
√√√√√( µ|g1|2 +
ν
|h1|2 +
1
ω(h, g)
)2
− 4

 µ
|g1|2
ν
|h1|2 −
γ1
(
µ
|g1|2 − ν|h1|2
)
− µ|g1|2
ω(h, g)


ω(h, g) = (ln 2)
λ21|h2|2
λ1|h2|2 + λ2|h1|2 (35)
and the pair (λ1, λ2) is chosen to satisfy the power constraint
E[a(h, g) + b(h, g)] ≤ P1 and E[p2(h, g)] ≤ P2. (36)
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Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity region vs. asynchronous secrecy rate region for the example L = 10 parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we study two numerical examples to illustrate the secrecy capacity regions of the parallel Gaussian
CMAC-CM and the fading CMAC-CM, respectively.
We first consider an L = 10 parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM. We assume that the source power constraints of users
1 and 2 are
P1 = 12 dB and P2 = 10 dB,
and the noise variances at the receivers of the destination and of user 2 are given by
ν = [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
and µ = [5, 3, 4, 9, 1, 10, 8, 7, 2, 6].
Fig. 3 illustrates the boundary of the secrecy capacity region for this channel. For comparison, we also consider the
asynchronous case, in which users 1 and 2 send the common message W0 in a asynchronous transmission mode.
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In this case, the secrecy rate region is given by
R[G]s =
⋃
p∈P


(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0;
R1 ≤
∑
j∈A
[
1
2 log
(
1 + bj
νj
)
1
2 log
(
1 + bj
µj
)]
R0 ≤
∑
j∈A
1
2 log
(
1 + aj+p2,j
bj+νj
)
+
∑
j∈A¯
1
2 log
(
1 + aj+p2,j
νj
)


(37)
where p is the power allocation vector, which consists of (aj , bj , p2,j) for j ∈ A and (aj , 0, p2,j) for j ∈ A¯ as
components, and the set P includes all power allocation vector p that satisfy the power constraint (22). We observe
that the synchronous transmission mode significantly increases the rate R0 of the common message since coherent
combining detection can be employed at the destination.
Next, we consider the Rayleigh-fading CMAC-CM, where h1, h2 and g1 are zero-mean proper complex Gaussian
random variables. Hence, |h1|2, |h2|2 and |g1|2 are exponentially distributed with means σ1, σ2 and σ3. We assume
that the power constraints of users 1 and 2 are P1 = P2 = 10 dB, and the noise variances at the receivers of
the destination and of user 2 are ν = µ = 2. In Fig. 4, we plot the boundaries of the secrecy capacity regions
corresponding to σ1 = 0.5, 1, 2 and fixed σ2 = σ3 = 1. It can been seen that as σ1 increases, both the secrecy
rate R1 of the confidential message W1 and the rate R0 of the common message W0 improve. This is because
larger σ1 implies a better channel from user 1 to the destination. In Fig. 5, we plot the boundaries of the secrecy
capacity regions corresponding to σ2 = 0.5, 1, 2 and fixed σ1 = σ3 = 1. It can been seen that as σ2 increases,
only the rate R0 of the common message W0 improves. In Fig. 6, we plot the boundaries of the secrecy capacity
regions corresponding to σ3 = 0.5, 1, 2 and fixed σ1 = σ2 = 1. It can been seen that as σ3 decreases, only the
rate R1 of the confidential message W1 improves.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have established the secrecy capacity region of the parallel CMAC-CM, in which it is seen that having
independent inputs to each subchannel is optimal. From this result, we have derived the secrecy capacity region
for the parallel Gaussian CMAC-CM and the ergodic secrecy capacity region for the fading CMAC-CM. We have
illustrated that, when both users know the CSI, they can dynamically adapt their transmission powers with the
channel realization to achieve the optimal performance.
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Fig. 4. Secrecy capacity regions for the example fading CMAC-CMs (P1 = P2 = 10 dB, ν = µ = 2, and σ2 = σ3 = 1).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Achievability: The achievability follows from [4, Corollary 3] by setting
Q := (Q1, . . . , QL), U := (U1, . . . , UL)
X1 := (X1,1, . . . ,X1,L), X2 := (X2,1, . . . ,X2,L)
Y := (Y1, . . . , YL), and Y2 := (Y2,1, . . . , Y2,L) (38)
with Q, U , X1, and X2 having independent components. Furthermore, we choose the components of these random
vectors to satisfy the condition
p(qj, uj , x1,j , x2,j, yj , y2,j) = p(qj, x2,j)p(uj |qj)p(x1,j |uj)p(yj, y2,j |x1,j, x2,j) for j = 1, . . . , L. (39)
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Using the above definition, we have the following achievable region
RPs :=
⋃
Q
j
p(qj ,x2,j)p(uj |qj)p(x1,j |uj)
p(yj ,y2,j|x1,j ,x2,j)


(R0, R1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0;
R1 ≤
∑L
j=1 [I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)]
R0 +R1 ≤
∑L
j=1 [I(Uj ,X2,j , Qj ;Yj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)]


.
(40)
Note that
[I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)] + I(X2,j , Qj ;Yj) = I(Uj ,X2,j , Qj ;Yj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj) (41)
and hence, any rate pair (R0, R1) ∈ CPs must also satisfies (R0, R1) ∈ RPs . This implies that the secrecy rate region
C[P]s is achievable.
Converse: By Fano’s inequality [11, Chapter 2.11], we have
H
(
W0,W1|Y n[1,L]
)
≤ n(R0,+R1)ǫ+ 1 := nδ (42)
where δ → 0 if ǫ→ 0. On the other hand, the information theoretic secrecy implies that
H(W1) ≤ H
(
W1|Y n2,[1,L],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
+ nǫ. (43)
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Now, we consider the upper bound on the secrecy rate R1 as
nR1 = H(W1)
≤ H
(
W1|Y n2,[1,L],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
+ nǫ (44)
≤ H
(
W1|Y n2,[1,L],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
−H
(
W1|Y n[1,L],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
+ n(ǫ+ δ) (45)
= I
(
W1;Y
n
[1,L]|Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
− I
(
W1;Y
n
2,[1,L]|Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
+ n(ǫ+ δ)
=
L∑
j=1
[
I
(
W1;Y
n
j |Y n[1,j−1],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
− I
(
W1;Y
n
2,j |Y n2,[j+1,L],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)]
+ n(ǫ+ δ) (46)
=
L∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
[
I
(
W1;Yj,i|Y i−1j , Y n[1,j−1],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)
− I
(
W1;Y2,j,i|Y n2,j,i+1, Y n2,[j+1,L],Xn2,[1,L],W0
)]
+ n(ǫ+ δ)
(47)
where (44) follows from the secrecy constraint (43), (45) follows from Fano’s inequality (42), and (46) and (47)
follow from the chain rule of mutual information [11, Chapter 2.5]. Let
Qj,i :=
(
Y i−1j , Y
n
[1,j−1], Y
n
2,j,i+1, Y
n
2,[j+1,L],X
n
2,[1,L],W0
)
. (48)
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We notice that this definition implies the Markov chain relationship
X2,j,i → Qj,i →W1 → X1,j,i. (49)
Then, following from [2, Lemma 7], we have
nR1 ≤
L∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
[I (W1;Yj,i|X2,j,i, Qj,i)− I (W1;Y2,j,i|X2,j,i, Qj,i)] + n(ǫ+ δ). (50)
We also can write
nR0 = H(W0)
≤ I(W0;Y n[1,L]) + nδ (51)
=
L∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
I(W0;Yj,i|Y i−1j , Y n[1,j−1]) + nδ (52)
≤
L∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
I(W0, Y
i−1
j , Y
n
[1,j−1], Y
n
2,j,i+1, Y
n
2,[j+1,L],X
n
2,[1,L];Yj,i) + nδ
=
L∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
I(Qj,i,X2,j,i;Yj,i) + nδ (53)
where (51) follows from Fano’s inequality (42), (52) follows from the chain rule, and (53) follows from the definition
of Qj,i in (48).
We introduce a time-sharing random variable T [11, Chapter 14.3] that is independent of all other random variables
in the model, and uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , n}. Define Qj = (T,Qi, j), Uj = (Qj,W1), X1,j = X1,T,j ,
X2,j = X2,T,j , Y2,j = X2,T,j , and Yj = YT,j for j = 1, . . . , L. Note that (Qj ,X1,j ,X2,j , Yj , Y2,j) satisfies the
following Markov chain relationship
Qj → Uj → (X1,j ,X2,j)→ (Yj , Y2,j), for j = 1, . . . , L. (54)
Using the above definition, (50) and (53) become
R1 ≤
L∑
j=1
[I (Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I (Uj;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)] + (ǫ+ δ).
and R0 ≤
L∑
j=1
I (X2,j , Qj ;Yj) + δ. (55)
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B. Proof of Theorem 2
The achievability follows from Theorem 1 by setting
Uj = X1,j for j ∈ A
and Qj = Uj = X1,j for j ∈ A¯. (56)
To show the converse, we first consider the upper bound on R0. By using (3) in Theorem 1, we have
R0 ≤
L∑
j=1
I(Qj,X2,j ;Yj)
=
∑
j∈A
I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) +
∑
j∈A¯
I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj)
≤
∑
j∈A
I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) +
∑
j∈A¯
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Yj) (57)
where (57) follows from the Markov chain relationships
Qj → (X1,j ,X2,j)→ Yj. (58)
Now, we consider the upper bound on R1. By applying Theorem 1, we obtain
R1 ≤
L∑
j=1
[I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)]
=
∑
j∈A
[I(Uj ;Yj|X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)] +
∑
j∈A¯
[I(Uj ;Yj|X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)]. (59)
For j ∈ A¯, the subchannel satisfies
p(yj, y2,j|x1,j , x2,j) = p(y2,j|x1,j , x2,j)p(yj|y2,j, x2,j), for j ∈ A¯. (60)
This implies that
I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j, Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj) ≤ I(Uj ;Yj|X2,j , Qj , Y2,j)
≤ I(Qj , Uj ;Yj|X2,j , Y2,j)
= 0 for j ∈ A¯ (61)
where the last equality of (61) follows from the Markov chain relationship
(Qj , Uj)→ (X1,j ,X2,j)→ (Y2,j,X2,j)→ Yj for j ∈ A¯. (62)
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On the other hand, for j ∈ A, the subchannel satisfies
p(yj, y2,j |x1,j, x2,j) = p(yj|x1,j, x2,j)p(y2,j |yj, x2,j), for j ∈ A. (63)
Hence, we obtain
I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I(Uj ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj) ≤ I(Uj ;Yj |X2,j , Qj , Y2,j)
≤ I(Uj ,X1,j ;Yj |X2,j , Qj , Y2,j)
= I(X1,j ;Yj |X2,j , Qj , Y2,j) (64)
= I(X1,j ;Yj , Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)− I(X1,j ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj) (65)
= I(X1,j ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− I(X1,j ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj) for j ∈ A (66)
where (64) follows from the Markov chain relationship
(Qj, Uj , Y2,j)→ (X1,j ,X2,j)→ Yj, (67)
(65) follows from the chain rule of mutual information, and (66) follows from the conditional degradedness (63).
Now, substituting (61) and (66) into (59), we obtain the bound on R1 given in (7). This concludes the proof of the
converse.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
By the degraded, same-marginals argument (see [4]), we need to prove Theorem 3 only for the channel defined
by (11)-(12).
Achievability: The achievability follows by applying Theorem 2 and choosing the input distribution as follows
Qj = constant, X2,j ∼ N (0, p2,j),
X ′1,j ∼ N (0, (1 − αj)p1,j), X ′1,j is independent of X2,j
and X1,j =
√
αjp1,j
p2,j
X2,j +X
′
1,j. (68)
Moreover, by the fact αj = 1 for j ∈ A¯, we obtain the secrecy rate region C[G]s is achievable.
Converse: Here, we derive a tight upper bound on the achievable weighted sum rate
R0 + γ1R1
using Theorem 2 as the starting point. Since a capacity region is always convex (via a time-sharing argument),
an exact characterization of all the achievable weighted sum rates for all nonnegative γ1 provides an exact
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characterization of the entire secrecy capacity region. By Theorem 2, any achievable rate pair (R0, R1) must
satisfy:
R0 + γ1R1 ≤
∑
j∈A
[I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) + γ1I(X1,j ;Yj|X2,j , Qj)− γ1I(X1,j ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)]
+
∑
j∈A¯
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Yj). (69)
For the subchannel j ∈ A¯, we are concerned only with the term
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Yj). (70)
The maximum-entropy theorem [11] implies that (70) is maximized when X1,j and X2,j are jointly Gaussian with
variance p1,j and p2,j repetitively, and are aligned, i.e., X1,j =
√
p1,j/p2,jX2,j . Hence, we have
I(X1,j ,X2,j ;Yj) ≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
p1,j + p2,j + 2
√
p1,jp2,j
νj
)
for j ∈ A¯. (71)
For the subchannel j ∈ A, we focus on the term
I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) + γ1I(X1,j ;Yj|X2,j , Qj)− γ1I(X1,j ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj).
Based on the channel model defined in (11)-(12), we have
I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) + γ1I(X1,j ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− γ1I(X1,j ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)
= h(Yj) + (γ1 − 1)h(Yj |X2,j , Qj)− γ1h(Y2,j |X2,j , Qj) + γ1
2
log
µj
νj
. (72)
Now, we consider the following two cases.
Case 1: γ1 ≤ 1. In this case, note that
h(Yj |X2,j , Qj) ≥ h(Yj |X1,j ,X2,j , Qj) = 1
2
log 2πeνj
h(Yj |X2,j , Qj) ≥ h(Y2,j |X1,j ,X2,j , Qj) = 1
2
log 2πeµj
and h(Yj) ≤ 1
2
log
(
p1,j + p2,j + 2
√
p1,jp2,j + νj
)
. (73)
Hence, we have
I(Qj ,X2,j ;Yj) + γ1I(X1,j ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− γ1I(X1,j ;Y2,j|X2,j , Qj)
≤ 1
2
log
(
1 +
p1,j + p2,j + 2
√
p1,jp2,j
νj
)
for j ∈ A and γ1 ≤ 1. (74)
This result implies that when the weight of the confidential-message rate is less than the weight of the common-
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message rate, the optimum solution is to allocate all possible power to transmit the common message.
Case 2: γ1 > 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that the conditional covariance of X1,j given (X2,j , Qj) is
given by
cov(X1,j |X2,j, Qj) = ρjp1,j (75)
where 0 ≤ ρj ≤ 1. By applying the extremal inequality [12, Theorem 8], we have
(γ1 − 1)h(Yj |X2,j , Qj)− γ1h(Y2,j |X2,j , Qj) ≤ γ1 − 1
2
log 2πe (ρjp1,j + νj)− γ1
2
log 2πe (ρjp1,j + µj) . (76)
Moreover, for a given ρj ,
h(Yj) ≤ 1
2
log
(
p1,j + p2,j + 2
√
(1− ρj)p1,jp2,j + νj
)
. (77)
Substituting (76) and (77) into (72), we obtain
I(Qj,X2,j ;Yj) + γ1I(X1,j ;Yj |X2,j , Qj)− γ1I(X1,j ;Y2,j |X2,j , Qj)
≤ max
0≤ρj≤1
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
p1,j + p2,j + 2
√
(1− ρj)p1,jp2,j
νj
)
+
γ1 − 1
2
log 2πe
(
1 +
ρjp1,j
νj
)
− γ1
2
log 2πe
(
1 +
ρjp1,j
µj
)]
= max
0≤αj≤1
[
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
(1− αj)p1,j
νj
)
− γ1
2
log
(
1 +
(1− αj)p1,j
µj
)
+
1
2
log
(
1 +
αjp1,j + p2,j + 2
√
αjp1,jp2,j
(1− αj)p1,j + νj
)]
for j ∈ A and γ1 > 1. (78)
Finally, combining (71), (74) and (78), we complete the converse proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We need fine the optimal p⋆ ∈ P that maximizes
R0 + γ1R1 (79)
where γ1 ≥ 0. The Lagrangian is given by
L =
∑
j∈A
[
1
2
log
(
1 +
aj + p2,j + 2
√
ajp2,j
bj + νj
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
bj
νj
)
− γ1
2
log
(
1 +
bj
µj
)]
+
∑
j∈A¯
1
2
log
(
1 +
aj + p2,j + 2
√
ajp2,j
νj
)
− λ1

∑
j∈A
(aj + bj) +
∑
j∈A¯
aj

− λ2 L∑
j=1
p2,j (80)
where λ1 and λ2 are Largrange multiplier.
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For j ∈ A¯, (a⋆j , p⋆2,j) needs to maximize the following Lj ,
Lj = 1
2
log
(
1 +
aj + p2,j + 2
√
ajp2,j
νj
)
− λ1aj − λ2p2,j. (81)
Taking derivative of the Lagrangian in (81) over aj and p2,j , the KKT conditions can be written as follows:
1
2 ln 2
θ1,j(aj , p2,j)√
aj
= λ1
and 1
2 ln 2
θ1,j(aj , p2,j)√
p2,j
= λ2 (82)
where
θ1,j(aj , p2,j) =
√
aj +
√
p2,j
νj + aj + p2,j + 2
√
ajp2,j
. (83)
This implies that the pair (a⋆j , p⋆2,j) that optimizes Lj must satisfy
p⋆2,j =
(
λ1
λ2
)2
a⋆j . (84)
Let us define
β = λ1/λ2. (85)
On substituting (84) into (81), we obtain that
Lj = 1
2
log
[
1 +
aj(1 + β)
2
νj
]
− λ1aj(1 + β)
=
∫ aj(1+β)2
0
t1,j(s) ds (86)
where
t1,j(s) =
1
(2 ln 2)
1
(νj + s)
− λ1
1 + β
. (87)
We define s1,j to be the root of the equation t1,j(s) = 0, i.e.,
s1,j =
1 + β
2λ1 ln 2
− νj
=
λ1 + λ2
2λ1λ2 ln 2
− νj. (88)
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Hence, we obtain, for j ∈ A¯,
a⋆j =
1
(1 + β)2
(s1,j)
+
=
λ22
(λ1 + λ2)2
(
λ1 + λ2
2λ1λ2 ln 2
− νj
)+
(89)
and
p⋆2,j = β
2a⋆j
=
λ21
(λ1 + λ2)2
(
λ1 + λ2
2λ1λ2 ln 2
− νj
)+
. (90)
For j ∈ A, (a⋆j , b⋆j , p⋆2,j) needs to maximize the following Lj:
Lj = 1
2
log
(
1 +
aj + p2,j + 2
√
ajp2,j
bj + νj
)
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
bj
νj
)
− γ1
2
log
(
1 +
bj
µj
)
− λ1(aj + bj)− λ2p2,j. (91)
Taking derivative of the Lagrangian in (91) over aj and p2,j , the KKT conditions can be written as follows:
1
2 ln 2
θ2,j(aj , bj , p2,j)√
aj
= λ1
and 1
2 ln 2
θ2,j(aj , bj , p2,j)√
p2,j
= λ2 (92)
where
θ2,j(aj , bj , p2,j) =
√
aj +
√
p2,j
νj + aj + bj + p2,j + 2
√
ajp2,j
. (93)
This implies that the pair (a⋆j , p⋆2,j) that optimizes Lj must satisfy
p⋆2,j =
(
λ1
λ2
)2
a⋆j = β
2a⋆j . (94)
On substituting (94) into (91), we obtain that
Lj = 1
2
log
[
1 +
aj(1 + β)
2
bj + νj
]
+
γ1
2
log
(
1 +
bj
νj
)
− γ1
2
log
(
1 +
bj
µj
)
− λ1[aj(1 + β) + bj ]
=
∫ bj+aj(1+β)2
bj
t1,j(s) ds+
∫ bj
0
t2,j(s) ds
≤
∫ ∞
0
(max{t1,j(s), t2,j(s)})+ ds (95)
where t1,j(s) is defined in (87) and
t2,j(s) =
γ1
2 ln 2
(
1
νj + s
− 1
µj + s
)
− λ1. (96)
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Next, we will derive (a⋆j , b⋆j , p⋆2,j) that achieves the upper bound on Lj in (95). We consider the point of intersection
between t1,j(s) and t2,j(s). By using the definitions of t1,j(s) in (87) and t2,j(s) in (96), the point of intersection
must satisfy
1
2 ln 2
1
νj + s
− λ1
1 + β
=
γ1
2 ln 2
(
1
νj + s
− 1
µj + s
)
− λ1, (97)
i.e.,
s2 +
(
µj + νj +
1
ω
)
s+
[
µjνj − γ1(µj − νj)− µj
ω
]
= 0 (98)
where
ω = (2λ1 ln 2)
β
1 + β
= (2 ln 2)
λ21
λ1 + λ2
. (99)
In the following, we consider two cases based on the relationship between ω and (γ1(µj − νj)− µj)/(µjνj).
1) ω ≥ γ1(µj−νj)−µj
µjνj
: In this case, (98) implies that the point of intersection between t1,j(s) and t2,j(s) is either
zero or negative. Moreover, it is easy to see, for s ≥ 0,
t1,j(s)− t2,j(s) = (νj + s)(µj + s)ω − [γ1(µj − νj)− (µj + s)]
(2 ln 2)(νj + s)(µj + s)
≥ 0. (100)
Hence, the upper bound on Lj in (95) is achieved by b⋆j = 0,
a⋆j =
1
(1 + β)2
(s1,j)
+
=
λ22
(λ1 + λ2)2
(
λ1 + λ2
2λ1λ2 ln 2
− νj
)+
(101)
and
p⋆2,j = β
2a⋆j
=
λ21
(λ1 + λ2)2
(
λ1 + λ2
2λ1λ2 ln 2
− νj
)+
(102)
where s1,j is defined in (88).
2) ω < γ1(µj−νj)−µj
µjνj
: In this case, (98) implies that, for s > 0, t1,j(s) and t2,j(s) intersect only once at
φj = −1
2
(
µj + νj +
1
ω
)
+
1
2
√(
µj + νj +
1
ω
)2
− 4
[
µjνj − γ1(µj − νj)− µj
ω
]
. (103)
26
Moreover, it is easy to see that t1,j(0) < t2,j(0). Hence, we have
t1,j(s) < t2,j(s) for 0 ≤ s < φj
and t1,j(s) ≥ t2,j(s) for s ≥ φj . (104)
Let s2,j denote the largest root of t2,j(s) = 0, i.e.,
s2,j =
1
2
[√
(µj − νj)
(
µj − νj + 2γ1
λ1 ln 2
)
− (µj + νj)
]
. (105)
The optimal (a⋆j , b⋆j , p⋆2,j) depends on the values t2,j(0), s1,j and φj , and falls into the following three possibilities.
(2.a) If t2,j(0) < 0, then both t1,j(s) and t2,j(s) are negative for s ≥ 0 (since both t1,j(s) and t2,j(s) are decreasing
functions for s ≥ 0). Then, the upper bound on Lj in (95) is achieved by b⋆j = 0, a⋆j = 0 and p⋆2,j = 0.
(2.b) If t2,j(0) ≥ 0 and s1,j < φj , then the upper bound on Lj in (95) is achieved by b⋆j = s2,j , a⋆j = 0 and
p⋆2,j = 0.
(2.c) If t2,j(0) ≥ 0 and s1,j ≥ φj , then the upper bound on Lj in (95) is achieved by b⋆j = φj ,
a⋆j =
1
(1 + β)2
(s1,j − φj) and p⋆2,j =
β2
(1 + β)2
(s1,j − φj) . (106)
Combing the cases (2.a), (2.b) and (2.c), we obtain
a⋆j =
λ22
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j − φj)+
b⋆j = (min [φj , s2,j])
+
and p⋆2,j =
λ21
(λ1 + λ2)2
(s1,j − φj)+ . (107)
Finally, the Lagrange parameters λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 are chosen to satisfy the power constraint (22).
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